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Abstract 
Drawing on surveys of voters and MPs in Greece, this article analyses elite-mass interaction 
on key policy (austerity, European integration, immigration) and ideological issues after the 
2012 elections. We find that while for the government parties, New Democracy and PASOK, 
the level of congruence is quite high, MPs from opposition parties (SYRIZA, Golden Dawn) 
place themselves in more exposed positions in comparison with their voters. The observed 
substantial variation in the intensity and direction of congruence, across parties and issue 
preferences in Greece, reinforces the view that the dimensionality of political contestation is 
not reducible to a single ideological dimension. 
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Introduction 
 
One of the most commonly used measurements of the quality of a democracy is the extent to 
which the positions of party elites and their supporters correspond across issue and 
ideological divides, which marks the degree of representation that exists within the system. 
An important tool to evaluate the performance of representative democracy is the concept of 
congruence. Policy or ideological congruence between political parties and their voters has 
been linked to higher levels of accountability and legitimacy and to higher levels of 
satisfaction with democracy. A low level of congruence on the other hand might signal the 
YRWHUV¶HYHQWXDOZLWhdrawal of support for a party in favour of others that most closely match 
their preferences on salient issues. 
 
Despite being at the centre of empirical political science research for well over half a century, 
ZKDW H[DFWO\ FRQVWLWXWHV µFRQJUXHQFH¶ DQG KRZ it is measured has remained open to 
contestation. For many, the degree of left-right congruence between electors and those 
HOHFWHGLVµFUXFLDO¶WRWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHTXDOLW\RISROLWLFDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQHJ+XEHU
& Powell 1994, p. 295; Freire & Belchior 2013). For others, an almost exclusive focus on the 
LGHRORJLFDO GLPHQVLRQ OHDGV WR D µEOLQG FRUQHU¶ RI SROLWLFDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ UHVHDUFK WR WKH
H[WHQW WKDW LW PLJKW µFRQFHDO YRWHUV¶ XQHTXDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ DFURVV LVVXH GLPHQVLRQV¶
(Thomassen 2012, pp. 14-15). The post-2009 economic crisis in Europe provides a renewed 
impetus to study the quality of representation, with elite-voters positioning on austerity, 
arguably, emerging as a key and separate dimension of congruence. 
 
In stable Western European democracies, the reported decline in the level of voter-party 
congruence on distributive policies could be seen as a rather abstract measurement that might 
have implications for the long-term development of political systems. In the case of the major 
economic crises experienced in Southern Europe since 2010, the question of the extent to 
which elected representatives adequately reflect the views of their voters takes on a more 
existential character. Can democratic regimes in Southern Europe survive the Eurozone 
crisis, particularly when unpopular austerity measures are being adopted and external actors 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) 
emerge as key stakeholders in the domestic policies of crises-ridden states? To what extent do 
the austerity policies promoted by parties in government and those promoted by parties in 
opposition reflect the views of their respective voters? Do domestic democratic priorities still 
matter in this context, or are they a mere illusion with decisions effectively made in Brussels, 
New York, Frankfurt or Berlin?  
 
This article explores these questions by focussing on elite-mass interaction on key policy and 
ideological issues under conditions of extreme austerity. Greece is used as a case study, as the 
FRXQWU\ PRVW VHYHUHO\ DIIHFWHG E\ WKH (XUR]RQH FULVLV ZKRVH HFRQRPLF µVDOYDWLRQ¶ ZDV
largely appropriated by the so-FDOOHG µWURLND¶ LH WKH ,0) WKH (&% DQG WKH (XURSHDQ
&RPPLVVLRQZKLFKSURYLGHGORDQVRI¼ELOOLRQLQ0D\DQG¼ billion in October 
2011. The centrality of unelected actors in the management of the Greek debt crisis, 
combined with the parallel collapse of public trust in domestic political institutions, rising 
dissatisfaction with democracy (Verney 2014) and mass anti-austerity protest (Rüdig & 
Karyotis 2014) signify a possible representation crisis that has thus far been left largely 
unexplored.  
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The analysis draws on original panel data of voters, mainly on a third wave collected in June 
2012, and an elite survey of Greek MPs conducted in July 2013 to answer the following 
questions: First, how well do parties represent the ideology of their voters? The scarcity of 
surveys of citizens and, particularly, of MPs in Greece means that this article offers a unique 
assessPHQWRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VLGHRORJLFDODQGSROLWLFDOVSHFWUXPDQGTXDOLW\RIGHPRFUDF\DWD
time of major political realignment. Second, how well do parties represent the attitudes of 
their voters on key policy issues? The focus here is on the key dimensions that have 
dominated public debates in Greece since the debt crisis erupted in early 2010. These are 
centrally about attitudes to austerity policies but also include the positioning of voters and 
MPs on other matters such as immigration and European integration, which became highly 
salient in the run-up to, and after, the 2012 Parliamentary elections and indicate broader value 
judgements that might not necessarily be correlated with economic or ideological attitudes. 
Third, to what extent do congruence patterns vary among parties and across dimensions of 
political conflict? The limited prior empirical research on cross-dimensional aspects of 
congruence offers an opportunity for an exploratory analysis. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: the first section engages with conceptual debates and 
ambiguities in relation to representation and proposes a four-dimensional framework to study 
congruence in the context of economic crisis and austerity politics. The second section draws 
upon these debates to identify key research hypotheses. The third section discusses 
methodological and data collection issues. Survey findings are presented in the fourth section, 
focussing on levels of elite-public congruence across a range of issues and discussing the 
implications of these findings. The overall analysis contributes to our understanding of the 
implications of austerity politics in Greece and beyond, while also addressing broader 
questions about the impact of the economic crisis on the quality of democracy and 
representation. 
 
Representation and Austerity Politics  
 
Political representation presupposes some linkage between the inputs (in terms of the 
articulation of the preferences, opinions or interests of the represented) and the outputs of the 
political process (in terms of collective decisions made by representatives in the form of 
public policies). The exact form this linkage takes is varied and has led to protracted 
conceptual and empirical contestation, but the form of primary concern for the present 
analysis is the reflection of the policy preferences of the represented in the policy preferences 
RI WKHLU UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKHUH LV DQ DVVXPSWLRQ YDULRXVO\ RI µSROLF\
FRQJUXHQFH¶ µLVVXHFRQJUXHQFH¶ µLGHRORJLFDO FRQJUXHQFH¶ µLVVXH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ RU µSROLF\
UHVSRQVLYHQHVV¶ VHH$QGHZHJS:DOJUDYH	/HIHYHUHS HPEHGGHG
within conceptions of electoral representation. This section engages with the relevant 
literature with a view to identifying the most pertinent dimensions of congruence that will be 
central to understanding political representation in the context of austerity politics and the 
Greek crisis. 
 
The most common approach to assess policy congruence is to compare µthe median voter 
with the position of the median legislaWRU¶$QGHZHJS2QHEDVLFSUREOHPZLWK
the use of measures of central tendency is the loss of information resulting from cases where 
the same mean or median is derived from very different distributions (see Pierce 1999, pp. 
14-15). Other problems include the fact that mean voter issue positions and elite issue 
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SRVLWLRQVDUHQRWQHFHVVDULO\FRQFHSWXDOO\DQDORJRXVDQGWKDWWKHPHDQSRVLWLRQRIDSDUW\¶V
voters may be closer to the mean position of the elite of another party than to the party they 
voted for. To overcome many of these difficulties, the present study seeks to discover the 
policy positions of voters and elected representatives alike by surveying them directly and 
asking them to position themselves on both a left-right scale and on issue scales. In this sense, 
WKLVGDWDFROOHFWLRQVWUDWHJ\IDOOV LQWRZKDW$QGHZHJSFDOOVD µUHODWLYHO\UDUH¶
category. 
 
The question that arises is what dimensions should be included in our analysis of elite-mass 
interaction under conditions of extreme austerity, such as those found in Greece? The starting 
point is clearly a focus on the ideological dimension. The left-ULJKW VFDOH µFDSWXUHV WKH
FRPSDUDWLYHLGHRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQVRIFLWL]HQVDQGSDUOLDPHQWDULDQVUHDVRQDEO\ZHOO¶%HOFKLRU
2010, pDQGRIIHUVDµSURJUHVVLYHDQGUHGLVWULEXWLYHYLHZRIWKHUROHRIWKHVWDWHDJDLQVW
a more conservative and market-RULHQWHG VWDWH RXWORRN¶ de Vries, Hakhverdian & Lancee 
2013, p. 223). For these reasons, left-right scales have been used widely as survey 
instruments in the study of representational congruence (Huber & Powell 1994; Schmitt & 
Thomassen 1999, Golder & Stramski 2010; Belchior 2010; Freire & Belchior 2013).  
 
However, the extent to which self-placement on left-right scales adequately captures the full 
range of issue positions has come into question for three main reasons. First, there are 
SRWHQWLDOSUREOHPVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDPELJXLWLHVLQWKHZD\WKDWµOHIW¶DQGµULJKW¶DUHSHUFHLYHG
by different voters, and between voters and their representatives ± to the extent that mass and 
elite positioning on the left-right scale is not necessarily conceptually analogous (Pierce 
1999, p. 14). For elites, particularly of ideologically extreme parties, self-placement in the 
two ends of the ideological spectrum might be strategically avoided (see Lefkofridi & 
Casado-Asensio 2013). For voters, inconsistency and incoherence in their belief systems and 
ideological preferences (Walgrave & Lefevre 2013, pp. 462-463) may impair their left-right 
positioning. In Southern European states in particular, where levels of education, media 
exposure and clarity of party policy alternatives are comparatively low (Freire & Bechoir 
2013, p. 2), lower levels of recognition of the left-right dimension have been observed than in 
the more established democracies in Western Europe (Freire 2008, p. 202). 
 
Second, a left-right scale taps primarily into economic issues, most closely associated with 
questions about the redistribution of wealth, taxing and spending, and the role of the state in 
the economy (see Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002; Dalton, Farrell & McAllister 2011; 
Costello, Thomassen & Rosema 2012). But although associated with such economic 
questions, the left-right scale calibrates broader general ideological orientations to these 
issues rather than substantive policy preferences as such (Belchior 2010, p. 124). The blurring 
of traditional ideological divides in Greece demonstrates the limitations of making 
DVVXPSWLRQV DERXW D SDUW\¶V HFRQRPLFSROLF\EDVHG RQ LWVPHPEHUV¶ VHOI-placement on the 
left-right scale. The austerity measures and bailout agreements were first introduced by the 
centre-left socialist ȆĮȞİȜȜȒȞȚȠ ȈȠıȚĮȜȚıĲȚțȩ ȀȓȞȘȝĮ (Panhellenic Socialist Movement, 
PASOK) and later supported by ǻȘȝȠțȡĮĲȚțȒ ǹȡȚıĲİȡȐ (Democratic Left, DIMAR), which 
joined the governing coalition in June 2012. In contrast, the centre-right ȃȑĮ ǻȘȝȠțȡĮĲȓĮ 
(New Democracy, ND) party, while in opposition, was critical of welfare retrenchment, 
before itself making a U-turn, joining a pro-austerity coalition government in November 2011 
and later winning the June 2012 elections. On the left, PASOK has competed with the 
ȀȠȝȝȠȣȞȚıĲȚțȩ ȀȩȝȝĮ ǼȜȜȐįĮȢ (Communist Party of Greece, KKE) but more recently, the 
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ȈȣȞĮıʌȚıȝȩȢ ȇȚȗȠıʌĮıĲȚțȒȢ ǹȡȚıĲİȡȐȢ (Coalition of the Radical Left, SYRIZA) became its 
main challenger. Also two parties emerged right of ND: ǹȞİȟȐȡĲȘĲȠȚ ǲȜȜȘȞİȢ (Independent 
Greeks, ANEL) and the extreme right ȋȡȣıȒ ǹȣȖȒ (Golden Dawn, XA).The observed 
mismatch between party ideology and expected positioning on austerity clearly points 
WRZDUGVWKHQHHGWRORRNLQFORVHUGHWDLODWHOLWHVDQGYRWHUV¶VXEVWDQWLYHSROLF\SUHIHUHQFHVLQ
the economic and other dimensions, particularly at such times of high volatility.  
 
7KLUGDQG UHODWHG WR WKHDERYH WKHµXQLGLPHQVLRQDOLW\¶RI WKH OHIW-right scale is questioned 
along with the extent to which policy issues and preferences are constrained by this 
dimension. Some analysts have identified non-economic dimensions of political contestation, 
called variously liberal-authoritarian (Kitschelt 1994), or green/alternative/libertarian versus 
traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002; Hooghe & Marks 2008), 
which is associated with socio-cultural values and the politics of identity. These two 
dimensions of political conflict, broadly economic and socio-cultural, are often deemed to be 
essentially orthogonal (van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 
2014, p. 79). Therefore, to compress political analysis into a single left-ULJKWGLPHQVLRQLVµDQ
RYHUVLPSOLILFDWLRQ¶'DOWRQ)DUUHOO	0F$OOLVWHUSWKDWcannot adequately capture 
their representation across issue dimensions (Thomassen 2012, pp. 14-15).  
 
The above discussion has highlighted the limitations of relying solely on left-right 
measurements to study represented-representative congruence. A further challenge is that the 
majority of prior studies have used either issue preferences or left-right self-placement, or 
deployed the latter as a proxy of the former. Rarely have the two measures been used 
together, other than in the works of Belchior (2010, 2014), Freire & Belchior (2013) and 
Costello, Thomassen & Rosema (2012). Our study of representation in Greece in the context 
of economic crisis builds on these attempts to incorporate different dimensions of congruence 
in a single framework. The choice of dimensions derives both from the existing literature 
discussed above and the specific national context and economic crisis conditions. The result 
is an exploratory four-dimensional framework that captures both ideological and issue-
specific policy areas that have dominated public debate since the crisis erupted. 
 
The first dimension to be included in our study is the ideological one, using the traditional 
left-right self-placement on a 0-10 scale. Given that this cannot reliably capture attitudes to 
specific policy alternatives and highly politicised issues, as discussed, we also use batteries of 
issue positions to tap substantive issue preferences and include additional dimensions of 
congruence. A key difference of this article from preceding studies of issue congruence is its 
specific focus upon attitudes to austerity and economic crisis. This represents the second 
dimension of our study, explored in its own right and not as a proximate left-ULJKWµHFRQRPLF¶
indicator.  
 
Any crisis typically generates a contest between competing frames concerning its nature and 
severity, the responsibility for its occurrence or escalation, and appropriate responses to 
curtail its development (Entman 1993). The crisis in Greece divided voters and parties into 
two main camps: those in favour of austerity and those against it. Central to the initial attempt 
of pro-austerity elites to legitimise the unprecedented austerity measures was a depiction of 
the debt crisis as an existential threat of exceptional urgency, which undermined both the 
HFRQRPLF DQG SROLWLFDO RUGHU DQG WKH FRXQWU\¶V SURVSHFWV RI UHPDLQLQJ D PHPEHU RI WKH
Eurozone (see Karyotis & Rüdig 2013). To measure the level of elite-YRWHUV¶FRQJUXHQFHRQ
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the austerity dimension, we thus ask two questions, one about its severity and another, more 
specifically, about the degree of acceptance of austerity measures in order to ensuUH*UHHFH¶V
continuing membership of the European currency. The latter is used as a proxy to map 
austerity attitudes, given that it captures one of the core dilemmas that dominated the 2012 
Parliamentary elections. 
 
Related to this, our third dimension concerns attitudes to European integration. The sluggish, 
fragmented and largely punitive response by the EU in the early stages of the Greek debt 
crisis divided political parties and voters on their trust and support for the European 
integration project (Clements, Nanou & Verney 2014; Papadimitriou & Zartaloudis 2015). In 
parallel to the austerity debate was the question of whether the European orientation of 
Greece could be sustained or was even desirable, at a time when European institutions were 
centrally involved in dictating unpopular domestic reforms. To measure this dimension, we 
use a question on whether European unification should be pushed further or has gone too far, 
using the 0-10 scale, a question widely used in (European) electoral and candidate studies.  
 
Our fourth dimension taps into socio-cultural aspects. Questions about authoritarianism vs. 
libertarianism were considered but do not seem to work in the Greek case ± both MPs and 
voters struggled to position themselves coherently in relation to these questions. What we 
focus on instead is immigration, which surprisingly emerged as one of the most salient topics 
in the run up to the 2012 elections (Karyotis & Skleparis 2013), with repercussions for the 
revival of nationalism and increase in support for far-right parties like Golden Dawn. To 
measure immigration attitudes, we rely on two standard questions used in cross-national 
surveys exploring the extent to which migrants increase criminality and have a positive effect 
on the Greek economy, using a 0-10 scale (see question wording in Appendix).  
 
 
Research Hypotheses 
 
The evaluation of representational congruence in this article covers four dimensions (left-
right ideology, austerity, Europe and immigration). Our approach is to an extent exploratory, 
since no clear tendency or pattern has been identified in previous studies of MP-voter 
congruence (Belchior & Freire 2013, p. 276), with the degree of congruence varying 
according to issue dimensions (Belchior 2010, p. 124). Some preliminary hypotheses derived 
from the literature are presented below and explored in the empirical discussion. 
 
Studies of issue linkage between voters and parties, focussing specifically on left-right 
congruence, reveal that party representatives tend to hold more pronounced ideological 
positions than their electorates (Dalton 1985, p. 275, Belchior 2010, p. 125). The first 
hypothesis, pertaining to the left-right dimension, is thus: 
 
H1: Greek MPs will typically hold a more pronounced ideological position than their 
voters. 
 
This pronounced positioning is particularly found for parties on the right and even more so 
for parties on the left (Dalton 1985, p. 275, Esaiasson & Holmberg 1996, pp. 92-95, 
Thomassen 1999, p. 46-50). Hence, an associated postulate is that µcentrist¶ parties, centre-
right or centre-OHIWSDUWLHVDSSHDOLQJWRWKHEURDGHUHOHFWRUDWHZKLFKPLJKWEHFDOOHGµFDWFK-
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DOO¶SDUWLHV (Kirchheimer 1966), are more congruent with the preferences of their supporters. 
7KLVIDFWRUVµSDUW\W\SH¶LQWRH[SODQDWLRQVRIFRQJUXHQFH,QGHHGRQHSURQRXQFHGWKHPHLQ
the literature is that catch-all parties, with an emphasis upon short-term vote-maximising 
strategies, will display higher levels of congruence than more ideologically extreme parties 
pursuing longer-term strategies of social mobilisation (see for example Iversen 1994, pp. 173-
177; Holmberg 1989, p. 12; Belchoir 2012, p. 356; Belchior & Freire 2013, pp. 276-277). 
This leads us to our second hypothesis:  
 
H2: Higher levels of ideological congruence will be observed between voters and 
representatives of the µcentrist parties¶ (New Democracy and PASOK), than for 
µLGHRORJLFDOSDUWLHV¶RQ WKH OHIW HVSHFLDOO\6<5,=$DQGRQ WKH ULJKW *ROGHQ
Dawn). 
 
In terms of the second dimension ± positioning with regard to austerity policies ± attitudes on 
the part of citizens and the policy positioning of political parties in responding to crisis can be 
expected to reflect fundamental macroeconomic divisions. Indeed, Maatch (2014, p. 99) 
when examining the factors accounting for the positioning of political parties on 
macroeconomic anti-crisis measures in the Eurozone, starts from the initial premise that: 
µparliamentary parties opt for macroeconomic measures which coincide with their general 
economic ideolRJ\ SDUWLHV ORFDWHG RQ WKH HFRQRPLF ³ULJKW´ RSW IRU QHROLEHUDO PHDVXUHV
ZKHUHDVSDUWLHVORFDWHGRQWKHHFRQRPLF³OHIW´DGYRFDWH.H\QHVLDQRQHV¶,QWKHFRQWH[WRI
WKH(XUR]RQHFULVLVKRZHYHUDUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQLVWKDWµSDUOLDPHQWDU\SDUWLHVLQVWates 
that received a bailout are more inclined to opt for Keynesian anti-FULVLVPHDVXUHV¶(2014, p. 
 7KH XQGHUSLQQLQJ DVVXPSWLRQ LV WKDW YRWHUV LQ EDLORXW VWDWHV µVWURQJO\ GLVDSSURYH RI
DXVWHULW\PHDVXUHV¶DQGDUHPRUHOLNHO\WRZHOFRPH.H\QHsian anti-crisis measures (2014, p. 
101). In which case parties, as a vote-seeking strategy, would be constrained in their stated 
preferences for austerity measures. Yet, Maatch (2014, p. 100) is also aware that institutional 
factors, particularly the divide between parties in government and parties in opposition, may 
impact on macroeconomic preferences. In which case, the proposition can be made that 
parties in government are more likely to support austerity policies, while opposition parties 
are expected to propose counter-austerity measures (Maatch 2014, p. 100).  
 
H3.1:  MPs are constrained in their positioning on austerity measures by their 
perceptions of voter antipathy to EU-imposed austerity policies.  
H3.2:  MPs of opposition parties will adopt stronger anti-austerity positions than MPs 
and voters of parties in government. 
 
Given the dominant role played by the EU in managing the crisis, one key question in Greek 
politics is how parties and voters are positioned in their respective attitudes to the European 
Union. Existing research suggests that attitudinal and policy positioning in relation to EU 
integration are not necessarily constrained by the left-right dimension (Costello, Thomassen 
& Rosema 2012, p. 1230). Existing studies have also found that parties adopting anti-EU 
positions are typically located closer to the extremes of the left-right dimension, whereas 
centrist parties have displayed more positive attitudes to EU integration (Rosema & de Vries 
2011, pp. 210-11, Costello, Thomassen & Rosema 2012, p. 1230). Lefkofridi & Casado-
Asensio (2013, p.107) found, however, that parties of the ideological left hold positions 
closer to the broader electorate on the EU dimension than do parties of the ideological right. 
Generally, political elites have been more supportive of EU integration than voters 
9 
 
(Steenberg, Edwards & de Vries 2007). Yet, the complexity of public attitudes towards the 
EU, and the change in those attitudes, should also be noted. In the case of Greece, successive 
Eurobarometer surveys, between 2009 and 2013, revealed a tripling of the negative image of 
the EU, a doubling of the belief that the EU was going in the wrong direction, as well as a 
doubling of level of mistrust in the EU. In the same period, however, positive attitudes 
towards the euro increased and remained well above the EU average after the 2012 elections. 
The hypotheses that can be formulated from the existing literature are thus: 
 
H4.1:  Parliamentary elites will be more supportive of EU integration than their voters. 
H4.2: Centrist parties will display more positive attitudes to the EU than more 
ideologically extreme parties, and voters and parties of the ideological right will 
display most anti-EU positioning. 
 
The fourth dimension ± positioning in relation to immigration ± has become of increased 
salience in most EU states (Lefkofridi & Horvath 2012, p. 29, Thomassen & van Ham 2014, 
p. 415). Early academic studies assumed that public positioning was generally anti-immigrant 
and that party positions on immigration were either absent or lacked diversity (see Freeman 
1995). More recent studies, however, have assumed that there is a diversity of public attitudes 
to immigration, and that parties do position themselves on immigration matters with 
something of an anti-immigrant bias (Lefkofridi & Horvath 2012, p. 310; Karyotis & 
Skleparis 2013). In the case of Greece, Lefkofridi & Horvath (2012, p. 36) found that the 
average citizen position was more restrictive than the average position of the political parties 
on immigration. The hypotheses to be examined therefore are: 
 
H5.1:  Voters will adopt stronger anti-immigration positions than their political 
representatives.  
H5.2:  Parties of the extreme right will be more congruent with their voters on the socio-
cultural/immigration dimension than parties of the extreme left. 
 
Data Collection 
 
To enable the direct comparison of ideological positions, issue preferences and attitudes, 
surveys, using identical questions, were undertaken for both voters and parliamentary 
representatives. Data on voters were collected through a telephone survey, conducted 
immediately after the June 2012 Parliamentary elections, using stratified quota sampling. The 
survey was carried out by a polling organisation, Kappa Research, and was part of a three-
wave panel study, with earlier measurements in December 2010 and December 2011. In the 
first wave, a dataset with a total of 1014 valid responses was generated that was 
representative of the distribution of the Greek adult population in terms of geographical 
location, gender and age. With high levels of attrition, a total number of 481 valid responses 
were collected in the third wave, which is most relevant to the current study. An analysis of 
the effects of attrition has not revealed any significant non-response bias. 
 
A survey of current Greek MPs was carried out in July 2013. In the first instance, a list of 
email addresses was compiled on the basis of information provided by the Office of the 
General Secretary of the Hellenic Parliament and other sources. All 300 MPs were contacted 
by email, and electronic reminders and follow-up phone calls were used to increased response 
rates. A major problem, however, was that many of the email addresses provided were 
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incorrect or were not monitored by the targeted MP. To boost participation further, therefore, 
a research assistant conducted the survey face-to-face with MPs in Parliament. The combined 
surveys produced a total of 52 responses. In a further step, a link to an anonymous survey 
was provided which enabled MPs to complete the questionnaire without revealing their 
identity. This resulted in a further 25 MPs completing the survey anonymously, of whom 20 
revealed their party affiliation. Members of all parties responded, with the exception of the 
Communist Party KKE, who refused to do so without explanation.  
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
In total 77 responses were obtained, a response rate of 26.7 per cent (excluding KKE). This 
article focuses on the 72 MPs for whom their party affiliation is known (see Table 1). The 
response rate varied greatly between parties, with particularly high response rates from MPs 
of the opposition parties ANEL and DIMAR. The response rates were particularly 
disappointing for MPs from the government parties New Democracy and PASOK. One 
possible explanation is that government MPs were reluctant to express positions that might 
have distanced them from their official party lines. Since many of the questionnaires were 
completed anonymously, it was not possible to use published data on the background of MPs 
to determine non-response bias. Overall, our response rate is in line with those of other 
surveys of MPs that were recently conducted in other European countries (cf. Deschouwer & 
Depauw 2014). Detailed analyses of surveys of political activists with low response rates 
suggests that any non-response bias is usually limited (Rüdig 2010). 
 
Ideological and Policy Congruence in Greece 
 
Opposition to austerity has come from both the left and the right. An important question 
relevant to our first dimension of representation concerns the extent to which the crisis has 
resulted in ideological incongruence or significant ideological radicalisation at both ends of 
the spectrum. To explore this, we asked voters and MPs to locate themselves on an 11-point 
scDOHIURPµlHIW¶WRµrLJKW¶7KHVFRUHVRQWKH-10 scales are displayed for each party in 
the boxplots in Figure 1(a). Included are all parties with MPs; the KKE is included but as its 
MPs refused to take part in the survey, only YRWHUV¶ data is available. In addition, we 
conducted further statistical analyses to test whether any differences in the positioning of 
voters and MPs are statistically significant.1 
 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
With the exception of Golden Dawn, representatives from all other parties self-place 
themselves in a more extreme ideological position than their supporters. This effect is most 
pronounced and statistically significant for SYRIZA, in line with the literature and hypothesis 
H1 that suggests that ideological parties, particularly on the left, are more likely to remain 
loyal to their ideological positions than centrist parties, which might make adjustments to 
their message based on short-term electoral calculations (Pierce 1999; Belchior 2012; 
Önnudóttir 2014:KLOH6<5,=$¶V03VILUPO\SRVLWLRQWKHPVHOYHVRQWKHOHIWWKHLUYRWHUV
are considerably more moderate. Clearly, in 2012 SYRIZA attracted many voters who were 
unhappy with the policies pursued by PASOK, but these voters on the whole did not place 
themselves on the extreme left.  
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As posited in H2, the centrist parties, New Democracy and PASOK, are the most congruent, 
as is typically the case across the EU (Belchior 2012). On the right, Golden Dawn is the most 
right-wing party but, remarkably, neither their voters nor their MPs position themselves on 
the extreme right. About half of Golden Dawn voters and MPs place themselves in a centre 
position, perhaps in a strategic attempt to defuse and reject the extreme-right label ascribed to 
them or, more likely, indicative of the ambiguities in the way they perceive µOHIW¶DQGµULJKW¶.2 
The overall picture suggests that, even in conditions of austerity and crisis, electors ± 
including DIMAR, SYRIZA and PASOK supporters ± positioned themselves close to the 
ideological centre. Only KKE voters position themselves towards the far left. 
 
Irrespective of the ideological dimension, the dominant issue of Greek politics since 2010 has 
been the austerity crisis. Greek political parties have offered competing narratives on both its 
severity and the necessity for extreme austerity measures. On its severity, we asked voters 
and MPs to assess on a scale of 0 to 10 how serious they considered the threat. At one end of 
the scale was the statement that the threat was exaggerated (0). At the other end of the scale 
(10) the argument was posed that *UHHFH¶VQDWLRQDOVXUYLYDOLVVHULRXVO\DWULVN ± an argument 
made repeatedly by the pro-austerity camp in order to legitimise the measures (see Karyotis 
& Rüdig 2013). Overall, both voters and MPs considered the threat to be very serious, but 
MPs had a slightly stronger perception of threat, as compared with voters (means 7.18 MPs, 
6.35 voters; statistically significant at p<0.001).3  
 
Does the level of congruence vary across parties with regards to the severity of the threat? 
The scores on the 0-10 scales are displayed for each party in the boxplots in Figure 1(b), 
which demonstrates a broad range of views in the general public of all political persuasions. 
The difference between voters and MPs was particularly marked for the main opposition 
parties SYRIZA, Independent Greeks and Golden Dawn. Their MPs saw the threat as 
particularly great. MPs of the government parties New Democracy, PASOK (and DIMAR) 
on the other hand appeared to be somewhat more relaxed about the threat involved. This is 
rather surprising as it represents a reversal of positions between the two camps compared to 
their rhetoric at the early stages of the crisis. A plausible explanation is that members of the 
governing coalition, three years after the crisis erupted, wanted to communicate a message of 
successfully managing and arresting the crisis, in an attempt to secure future electoral gains. 
 
A closer look at the level of congruence on the austerity dimension is displayed in Figure 
1(c). We asked voters and MPs to rate their attitudes to austerity policies on a scale of 0 and 
 ZLWK µ¶ VWDQGLQJ IRU DEDQGRQLQJ DXVWHULW\ SROLFLHV HYHQ LI WKLV ULVNHG OHDYLQJ WKH
(XUR]RQH DQG µ¶ IRU DFFHSWLQJ DXVWHULW\ PHDVXUHV DQG GR ZKatever it takes to remain 
within the Eurozone. Figure 1(c) reveals divergences in the level of support for austerity 
measures between voters for the main government parties and voters for the opposition 
parties. Support for austerity policies was strongest among voters of the two government 
parties New Democracy and PASOK. Overall, even these voters offered relatively lukewarm 
support (ND mean 6.50; PASOK 6.43). Initially, DIMAR had also been a member of the 
government, led by ND-leader Antonis Samaras, but decided to leave the coalition in June 
2013, just before our MP survey was conducted. DIMAR voters were not very supportive of 
DXVWHULW\SROLFLHVPHDQDQGWKXVWKHSDUW\¶VGHFLVLRQWROHDYHWKHJRYHUQPHQWORRNVWR
have been in line with the wishes of their voters (and in accordance with H3.1).  
 
12 
 
Our results also reveal that there was little difference between the attitudes of voters and MPs 
respectively for ND and PASOK. The contrast between the attitudes of voters and MPs was 
far stronger for the main opposition parties. Here, the views of MPs were far more clearly 
anti-austerity than their voters. This applies to a virtually identical degree to SYRIZA, the 
Independent Greeks and Golden Dawn. With SYRIZA becoming the main opposition party 
in the 2012 elections and the main challenger against the pro-austerity government, the gap 
between MPs positioning themselves as strong opponents of austerity and SYRIZA voters 
displaying more moderate positions (means 1.88 for MPs and 3.51 for voters, statistically 
significant at p<0.05 level) may be seen as particularly significant. These findings challenge 
H3.1 to the extent that voters in our sample were more likely to approve of austerity measures 
than their representatives, yet at the same time the findings offer support for H3.2 that MPs 
from opposition parties adopt stronger anti-austerity positions than MPs and voters of parties 
in government. 
 
The third dimension in our framework examines how voters and parties are positioned in 
their respective attitudes to the European Union. A particularly pertinent question is whether 
there is a gap between parliamentary parties and their voters in their positioning in relation to 
EU integration? The significance of this question was only heightened given the 
interventionist role of the EU in the imposition of austerity programmes in Greece. To 
measure attitudes to EU integration we asked voters and MPs to locate themselves on another 
11-point scale, from opposition to further unification (0) to demands for unification to be 
pushed further (10).  
 
The results shown in Figure 1(d) indicate, against the expectation of H4.1, that there is no 
major difference between voters and MPs on European integration for most parties. ND and 
PASOK supporters are generally pro-EU. DIMAR is one case where there is a major 
difference between voters and MPs, as voters display considerably lower support for EU 
integration than their representatives. Among the main opposition parties, there are major 
differences (basically in line with H4.2). Golden Dawn is the party most hostile to the EU. 
ANEL supporters and MPs display a broad range of views, as do SYRIZA supporters and 
MPs. As a party challenging for leading an alternative government, the attitudes shown by 
SYRIZA show a certain ambiguity. Overall, the majority of SYRIZA voters and MPs are 
clearly pro-EU, but anti-EU views also are present. In that sense, MPs represent the range of 
YLHZVKHOGE\WKHSDUW\¶VVXSSRUWHUV 
 
The fourth dimension in our analysis ± positioning in relation to immigration ± has, as noted 
above, become of increased salience in most EU states. Certainly in the case of Greek politics 
the issues of immigration and austerity have become inextricably intertwined (Karyotis & 
Skleparis 2013). To measure levels of congruence on this issue, we constructed an index of 
the degree of agreement/disagreement, which was derived from two contrasting statements on 
LPPLJUDWLRQ µLPPLJUDQWV DUH JHQHUDOO\ JRRG IRU WKH *UHHN HFRQRP\¶ DQG µLPPLJUDQWV
LQFUHDVHFULPHUDWHV¶8WLOLVLQJWKHDQVZHUVWRWKHVHVWDWHPHQWVDQ-point scale was created 
(Figure 1(e)) to facilitate comparisons with the other results.4 
 
On this issue, the MPs of Golden Dawn predictably adopted strong anti-immigration 
positions, with all MPs positioning themselves at the extreme end of the scale. Golden Dawn 
voters took a clear, but less extreme, anti-immigration position than their representatives. 
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Similarly for ANEL, a right-wing opposition party, MPs displayed more pronounced anti-
immigrant attitudes than their voters. Thus, in the case of these two parties, H5.1 was not 
sustained. Voters of other parties displayed a broader spread of positioning than their 
representatives, with anti-immigration attitudes evident in voters for all parties. SYRIZA 
voters in particular adopted a more pronounced anti-immigration position than their 
representatives in parliament.  
 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
What then can we say on the basis of these comparisons about the determinants of policy 
congruence? In Table 2, we present the results of both bi-variate and multi-variate statistical 
analyses comparing voters and MPs.  In the bi-variate analysis, the differences of means 
between voters and MPs for the five ideological positions are displayed. Several patterns 
emerge. The largest differences between voters and MPs are present on austerity issues and 
immigration. The general level of congruence is higher for left-right positions and EU 
attitudes. Comparing parties, the level of congruence between voters and MPs is greatest for 
the two government parties, ND and PASOK. All opposition parties display a far lower level 
of congruence, with SYRIZA the party having the largest differences between voters and 
MPs.  
 
Going beyond these descriptive comparisons between parties, we conclude our analysis with 
an exploratory attempt to introduce a multi-variate perspective. In particular, we are 
interested in analysing whether once we control for the left-right position of voters and MPs, 
other dimensions actually make a difference or not. In other words, is the level of 
incongruence present in opposition parties mainly determined by the general left-right 
positioning of voters and MPs, or do attitudes to austerity and/or immigration feature as 
independent source of incongruence? In order to present a multi-variate analysis of 
FRQJUXHQFHZHFRPELQHRXUWZRVXUYH\VDQGVHHNWRµSUHGLFW¶ZKRLVDQ03DQGZKRLVD
voter on the basis of their positions on our five dimensions.  
 
Unfortunately, the low number of cases we have makes a binary logistic regression 
potentially problematic. We thus present results of an exact logistic regression, a statistical 
technique that has become fairly popular in bio-medical research and is designed to produce 
reliable results for logistic regressions in studies with a small sample size (cf. Mehta & Patel 
1995; Hosmer, Lemeshow & Sturdivant 2013, pp. 387-395). However, this technique is 
computationally rather intensive and calculations are not always successfully concluded.5  
Exact logistic regressions could successfully be calculated for SYRIZA, ANEL and 
DIMAR.6  
 
The results for SYRIZA show clearly that left-right position and attitudes to immigration are 
the main determinants of the overall level of incongruence. Once these dimensions are 
controlled for, the austerity variables are not statistically significant predictors. The left-right 
dimension thus is more important than attitudes towards austerity but also the socio-cultural 
dimension plays an independent role. For ANEL, the reverse is the case as attitudes to 
austerity policies is the only statistically significant determinant of incongruence between 
voters and MPs. Finally, for DIMAR, the exact logistic regression confirms that attitudes the 
EU is the main source of differences between DIMAR voters and MPs, with voters adopting 
a more eurosceptic position than their MPs. 
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Conclusion 
 
This article has examined congruence between ideological positioning and attitudes to 
specific policy issues held respectively by Greek parliamentary representatives and their 
electorates at a time of economic crisis. The broad conclusion that has emerged is that 
congruence between MPs and voters varies both in intensity and direction depending upon 
whether left-right self-placement or substantive issue preferences ± on austerity, EU 
integration or immigration ± are used as measures of congruence.   
 
Given the nature of our samples, our findings are indicative rather than definitive. 
Nonetheless, the results indicate that, in terms of left-right self-placement, there is broad 
congruence with parliamentarians, only marginally more extremely positioned ideologically 
than their voters. Only in the case of SYRIZA was the difference in self-placement 
particularly pronounced. Yet, if there is a broad congruence between voters and parties on 
left-right positioning there is no guarantee, as existing studies have already shown, that this 
will translate into congruence on attitudinal positioning on specific policy issues. While we 
found no major difference between voters and MPs on attitudes to European integration, 
which in itself is surprising given the belief that parliamentary elites are supposedly more 
pro-EU than ordinary voters, there was an apparent gap between the positions of voters and 
the positions of their party representatives on immigration. Voters of all parties displayed a 
broader range of positioning on this issue than their representatives; but, in terms of the 
direction of dissonance, far right MPs adopted more pronounced anti-immigration positions 
than their voters. At the other end of the ideological spectrum, however, SYRIZA MPs 
DGRSWHGVWURQJHUµSUR-¶SRVLWLRQVthan their voters. 
 
These findings mirror other studies that have already found different levels of MP-voter 
congruence between ideological self-placement and positioning in relation to specific policy 
preferences (see, for example, Freire & Belchior 2013). Where our study has greater claims 
to novelty, however, is in its probing of attitudes towards austerity ± both in terms of 
perceived threat and policy preferences. Here the average difference between MPs and voters 
was greater than for other scales of positioning, with the exception of immigration. What is 
particularly noteworthy about this finding is that there were divergences in the perception of 
threat and the level of support for austerity measures between voters for the main government 
parties and for the opposition parties. Congruence of austerity positions was greater for 
government parties (ND and PASOK) than for opposition parties. For the latter, the positions 
adopted by MPs were clearly more anti-austerity than those of their voters.  
 
These results have important and tangible implications for party politics in Greece. Greek 
voters appear to adopt different positions across different policy/issue dimensions, which 
adds to the volatility of the representative process. This is particularly the case for SYRIZA. 
In the 2012 elections, a large section of the electorate turned to SYRIZA in what was seen as 
an anti-government and anti-austerity vote. Yet, our surveys clearly show that the attitudes of 
SYRIZA voters remained fairly distant from their representatives in parliament. In essence, 
many SYRIZA voters did not share the radical anti-austerity position, or the pro-immigration 
stance, adopted by SYRIZA MPs. The reported increase in support for SYRIZA in polls 
conducted in the summer of 2014 is most likely indicative of the party moderating its own 
positions, rather than taking its voters with it. At the other ideological extreme there was 
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considerable incongruence between Golden Dawn voters and their parliamentary 
representatives, especially in their attitudes to austerity policies and the perception of threat 
posed by the Eurozone crisis, as well as to immigration. Golden Dawn MPs were 
significantly more anti-austerity and anti-immigration than their voters. 
 
In this respect, the analysis of the Greek case highlights the importance of exploring issue 
dimensions beyond a simple left-right ideological dimension. The observed substantial 
variation in congruence, across parties and issue preferences in Greece, reinforces the view 
that the dimensionality of political contestation is not reducible to a single ideological 
dimension. This is particularly true at times of crisis and high political volatility, where 
positioning on austerity, immigration and European integration, move to centre stage in the 
dynamic process of linkage between represented and representatives. Our analysis reveals 
that there is no necessary correlation between the various dimensions. For instance, there are 
voters displaying pro-austerity and anti-immigration preferences who position themselves on 
WKHLGHRORJLFDOµOHIW¶ZKLOHRWKHUVSODFLQJWKHPVHOYHVRQWKHµULJKW¶KROGVWURQJDQWL-austerity 
positions. The challenge for voters and parties alike is that dissonance across dimensions 
prompts matrix calculations of who to support (for voters) and where support is likely to 
come from (for parties). Our study is of significance in pointing to the complexity of 
representation ± to the heterogeneity of positions across multi-dimensions and across and 
within parties ± in times of crisis that simultaneously encompasses representational 
congruence and incongruence. 
 
Future research might profitably consider the dynamics of simultaneous congruence and 
incongruence across multi-dimensions. Our study is of one point in time at one stage of crisis. 
Other studies are needed to examine how this relationship develops over time, of how 
attitudes and positions of voters and parties change diachronically and how voters perceive 
and prioritise their positions on some dimensions relative to others. Some of these avenues 
for future research have already been mapped from the perspective of voters and electoral 
behaviour (see Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014, Walgrave & Lefevere 2013); our call 
is for further analysis of the nature of representational linkage beyond elections to incorporate 
studies of crosscutting pressures on parliamentarians in effecting policy choices and of how 
voters and representatives respond to perceived incongruence. 
 
  
16 
 
References  
Andeweg, R. B. (2011) µ$SSURDFKLQJSHUIHFWSolicy congruence: measurement, development, 
and relevance for political rHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ LQ How Democracy Works: Political 
Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies, eds M. Rosema, B. Denters 
& K Aarts, Pallas Publications, Amsterdam, pp. 39-52. 
BehnkH -  µ/DVVHQ VLFK VLJQLILNDQ]WHVWV DXI Yollerhebungen anwenden? Einige 
essayistische aQPHUNXQJHQ¶Politische Vierteljahresschrift, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. O_1-O_15. 
BelchLRU$0µ,GHRORJLFDOFRQJUXHQFHDPRQJ(uropean political pDUWLHV¶Journal 
of Legislative Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 121-142. 
BelcKLRU $ 0  µ([SODLQLQJ OHIW-right party congruence across European party 
systems a test of micro-, meso-, and macro-level mRGHOV¶Comparative Political Studies, 
vol. 46, no 3, pp. 352-386. 
Belchior, $0µ([SODLQLQJ03V¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIYRWHUV¶SRVLWLRQVLQDSDUW\-mediated 
representation system: evidence from the Portuguese cDVH¶Party Politics, vol. 20, no. 3, 
pp. 403-415. 
Belchior, A. M. & Freire, A. (2013) µ,VSDUW\W\SHUelevant to an explanation of congruence? 
catch-all versus ideological parties in the Portuguese cDVH¶ International Political 
Science Review, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 273-288. 
Berk, R. A., Western, B. & WeLVV 5 (  µ6WDWLVWical inference for apparent 
pRSXODWLRQV¶Sociological Methodology, vol. 25, pp. 421-458. 
%URVFKHLG $ 	 *VFKZHQG 7  µ=XU VWDWLVWLVFKHQ $QDO\VH YRQ 9ROOHUKHEXQJHQ¶
Politische Vierteljahresschrift, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. O_16-O_26. 
Clements, B., Nanou, K. & Verney, S. (2014) µ³:HQo ORQJHUORYH\RXEXWZHGRQ¶WZDQWWR
OHDYH \RX´ WKH (XUR]RQH FULVLV DQG SRSXODU HXURVFHSWLFLVP LQ *UHHFH¶ Journal of 
European Integration, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 247-65. 
Costello, R., Thomassen, J. & 5RVHPD 0  µ(XURSHDQ SDUOLDPHQW HOHFWLRQV DQG
political representation: policy congruence between voters and pDUWLHV¶ West European 
Politics, vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 1226-1248.  
Dalton, R. J. (1985) µ3ROLWLFDOSDUWLHVDQGSROLWLFDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQSDUty supporters and party 
elites in nine nDWLRQV¶Comparative Political Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 267-299. 
Dalton, R. J., Farrell, D. M. & McAllister, I. (2011) Political Parties and Democratic 
Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
de Vries, C. E., Hakhverdian, A. & Lancee, B.  µ7KH G\QDPLFV RI YRWHUV¶ OHIWULJKW
LGHQWL¿FDWLRQWKHUROHRIHFRQRPLFDQGFXOWXUDODWWLWXGHV¶ Political Science Research and 
Methods, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 223-238. 
Deschouwer, K. & Depauw, S. (eds) (2014) Representing the People: A Survey among 
Members of Statewide and Sub-state Parliaments, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
(QWPDQ 5 0  µ)UDPLQJ WRZDUG FODULILFDWLRQ RI D IUDFWXUHG SDUDGLJP¶ Journal of 
Communication, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 51-58. 
Esaiasson, P. & Holmberg, S. (1996) Representation from Above: Members of Parliament 
and Representative Democracy in Sweden, Aldershot, Dartmouth. 
)UHHPDQ *  µ0RGHV RI LPPLJUDWLRQ SROLWLFV LQ OLEHUDO GHPRFUDWLF VWDWHV¶
International Migration Review, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 881-902. 
Freire, A. µ3DUW\SRODUL]DWLRQDQGFLWL]HQV¶OHIW-right oULHQWDWLRQV¶Party Politics, vol. 
14, no. 2, pp. 189-209. 
Freire, A. & BeOFKLRU $  µ,GHRORJLFDO UeSUHVHQWDWLRQ LQ 3RUWXJDO 03V¶-electorV¶
linkages in terms of left-right placement and substantive mHDQLQJ¶Journal of Legislative 
Studies, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 1-21. 
Golder, M. & StUDPVNL -  µ,GHRORJLFDO FRQJUXHQFH DQG HOHFWRUDO LQVWLWXWLRQV¶
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 90-106. 
+ROPEHUJ 6  µ3ROLWLFDO rHSUHVHQWDWLRQ LQ 6ZHGHQ¶ Scandinavian Political Studies, 
vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 1-36. 
Hooghe, L. & Marks, *  µ$3RVWIXQFWLRQDOLVW WKHRU\ RI (XURSHDQ LQWHJUDWLRQ IURP
permissive consensus to constraining dLVVHQVXV¶British Journal of Political Science, vol. 
17 
 
39, no. 1, pp. 1-23. 
Hooghe, L., Marks, G. & Wilson, C. J. (2002) µ'RHV/HIW5LJKW6WUXFWXUH3DUW\3RVLWLRQVRQ
(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ"¶Comparative Political Studies, vol. 35, no. 8, pp. 956-989. 
Hosmer, D.W. Jr., Lemeshow, S. & Sturdivant, R. X. (2013) Applied Logistic Regression, 3rd 
ed. , John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken (N.J).  
Huber, J. D. & PoZHOO*%µ&RQJUXHQFHEHWZHHQFLWL]HQVDQGSROLF\PDNHUVLQWZR
visions of liberal democrac\¶World Politics, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 291-326. 
Iversen, 7  µ7KH /RJLFV RI HOHFWRUDO SROLWLFV VSDWLDO GLUHFWLRQDO DQG PRELOL]DWLRQ
eIIHFWV¶Comparative Political Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 155-89. 
Karyotis, G. & 5GLJ:µ%ODPHDQGSXQLVKPHQW"7KHHOHFWRUDOSROLWLFVRIH[WUHPH
aXVWHULW\ LQ *UHHFH¶ Political Studies, published online 13 September 2013, DOI: 
10.1111/1467-9248.12076. 
.DU\RWLV * 	 6NOHSDULV '  µQui bono? The winners and losers of securitising 
mLJUDWLRQ¶Griffith Law Review, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 683-706. 
.LUFKKHLPHU 2   µ7KH 7UDQVIRUPDWLRQ RI WKH :HVWHUQ (XURSHDQ 3DUW\ 6\VWHPV¶ LQ 
Political Parties and Political Development, eds J. LaPalombara & M. Weiner, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton (N.J).  
Kitschelt, H. (1994) The Transformation of Social Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Lefkofridi, Z. & Casado-$VHQVLR-µ(XURSHDQYR[UDGLFLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGSROLF\
congruence on the e[WUHPHV¶Comparative European Politics, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 93-118. 
/HINRIULGL=	+RUYDWK.µ0LJration policy issues and representation in European 
liberal dHPRFUDFLHV¶Representation, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 29-46. 
Lefkofridi, Z., Wagner, N., & Willmann, J. E.  µ/HIW-authoritarians and policy 
representation in Western Europe: electoral choice across ideological dLPHQVLRQV¶West 
European Politics, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 65-90. 
0DDWFK$µ$UHZHDll austerians now? An analysis of national parliamentary SDUWLHV¶
positioning on anti-crisis mHDVXUHVLQWKH(XUR]RQH¶Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 96-115. 
0HWKD & 5 	 3DWHO 15  µ([DFW /RJLVWLF 5HJUHVVLRQ 7KHRU\ DQG ([DPSOH¶
Statistics in Medicine, vol. 14, no. 19, pp. 2143-2160. 
ÖnQXGyWWLU ( +  µ3ROLF\ FRQJUXHQFH DQG VW\OH RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ SDUW\ YRWHUV DQG
political pDUWLHV¶West European Politics, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 538-63. 
Papadimitriou, D. & ZaUWDORXGLV 6  µ(XURSHDQ GLVFRXUVHV RQ PDQDJLQJ WKH Greek 
crisis: denial, distancing and bODPLQJ¶ LQ The Politics of Extreme Austerity, eds G. 
Karyotis & R. Gerodimos, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
3LHUFH5µ0DVV-elite issue linkages & the responsible party model of rHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶
in Policy Representation in Western Democracies, eds W. E. Miller, R. Pierce, J. 
Thomassen, R. Herrera, S. Holmberg, P. Esaiasson, & B. Wessels, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, pp. 9-32 
Rosema, M. & de Vries &(  µ$VVHVVLQJ WKH TXDOLW\ RI (XURSHDQ GHPRFUDF\ DUH
voters voting cRUUHFWO\"¶, in How Democracy Works: Political Representation and Policy 
Congruence in Modern Societies, eds M. Rosema, B. Denters & K Aarts, Pallas 
Publications, Amsterdam, pp. 199-219. 
5GLJ :  µ$VVHVVLQJ 1RQUHVSRQVH %LDV LQ $FWLYLVW 6XUYH\V¶ Quality & Quantity, 
vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 173-180. 
Rüdig, : 	 .DU\RWLV *  µ:KR Srotests in Greece? Mass opposition to aXVWHULW\¶
British Journal of Political Science, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 487-513. 
Schmitt, H. & Thomassen, J. (eds) (1999) Political Representation and Legitimacy in the 
European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
6WHHQEHUJHQ05(GZDUGV((	GH9ULHV&µ:KR¶Vcueing whom? Mass-elite 
linkages and the future of European iQWHJUDWLRQ¶European Union Politics, vol. 8, no. 1, 
pp. 13-35.  
ThRPDVVHQ -  µ3ROLWLFDO FRPPXQLFDWLRQ EHWZHHQ SROLWLFDO Hlites and mass publics: 
The role of belief s\VWHPV¶LQPolicy Representation in Western Democracies, eds W. E. 
18 
 
Miller, R. Pierce, J. Thomassen, R. Herrera, S. Holmberg, P. Esaiasson, & B. Wessels, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
7KRPDVVHQ-µ7KHElind corner of political rHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶Representation, vol. 48, 
no. 1, pp.13-27. 
Thomassen, J. & van Ham, C  µFailing political representation or a change in kind? 
Models of representation and empirical tUHQGV LQ(XURSH¶West European Politics, vol. 
37, no. 2, pp. 400-19. 
YDQGHU%UXJ:	YDQ6SDQMH-µ,PPLJUDWLRQ(XURSHDQGWKH³QHZVRFLR-cultural 
dLPHQVLRQ´¶European Journal of Political Research, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 309-334. 
9HUQH\ 6  µ³%URNHQ DQG FDQ¶W EH IL[HG´ WKH LPSDFW RI WKH HFRQRPLF FULVLV RQ WKH
Greek party s\VWHP¶ The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 
vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 18-35. 
Walgrave, S. & /HIHYHUH -  µ,GHRORJ\ VDOLHQFH DQG FRPSOH[LW\ GHWHUPLQDQWV RI
policy issue incongruence between voters and pDUWLHV¶ Journal of Elections, Public 
Opinion and Parties, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 456-483. 
 
  
19 
 
Appendix: Question Wording 
 
Left-Right Placement 
,QSROLWLFVSHRSOHVRPHWLPHV WDONRI³OHIW´DQG³ULJKW´:KHUHZRXOG\RXSODFH\RXUVHOIRQ
this 0-10 scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? 
Severity of Threat: 
There are GLIIHUHQW YLHZV DERXW KRZ VHULRXV D WKUHDW WKH FXUUHQW FULVLV SRVHV WR *UHHFH¶V
future.  On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that the threat is vastly exaggerated and 10 
PHDQV WKDW *UHHFH¶V QDWLRQDO VXUYLYDO LV VHULRXVO\ DW ULVN ZKLFK QXPEHU GHVFULEHV your 
position? 
Positions on Austerity: 
Imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means to completely abandon austerity in Greece and 
risk leaving the Euro, and 10 means to accept whatever austerity measures are necessary to 
stay in the Eurozone.  Which number best describes your position on this scale?  
European Integration: 
Some say European unification should be pushed further.  Others say it already has gone too 
IDU:KDWLV\RXURSLQLRQ"2QWKHVDPHVFDOHIURPWRZKHUHPHDQVXQLILFDWLRQµKDV
already JRQHWRRIDU¶DQGPHDQVLWµVKRXOGEHSXVKHGIXUWKHU¶ZKDWLV\RXUSRVLWLRQ" 
Immigration: 
7RZKDWH[WHQWGR\RXDJUHHRUGLVDJUHHZLWKWKHIROORZLQJ« 
b. Immigrants are generally good for the Greek economy. 
d. Immigrants increase crime rates 
(strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree) 
Party or Vote Choice: 
For Elites: What party do you currently represent? 
For Voters: Which party did you vote for in the 17 June 2012 Parliamentary elections?  
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Figure 1: Comparing Voters and MPs* 
a) Left-Right Positioning 
 
b) Perception of the Degree of Threat Involved in the Debt Crisis 
 
c) Attitudes to Austerity Policies 
 
d) Attitudes to European Integration 
 
e) Attitudes to Immigration 
 
7KHILJXUHVVKRZµER[SORWV¶7KHthick horizontal line identifies the median; the box indicates the range of 
50% of the responses, while the bottom and top horizontal lines indicate the minimum and maximum values, 
respectively; a circle indicates a mild outlier, an asterisk an extreme outlier; for abbreviations (party names), see 
Table 1.  Source: Own data. 
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Table 1 Response Rates, MPs Survey, July 2013 
 
Party Position Number of 
MPs 
Respondents Response rate 
New Democracy (ND) Government 127 15 11.8 % 
Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement  (PASOK) 
Government 28 4 14.3 % 
    Gov. parties:  
12.2 % 
Coalition of the Radical 
Left (SYRIZA) 
Opposition 72 20 27.8 % 
Golden Dawn (XA) Opposition 18 7 38.9 % 
Independent Greeks 
(ANEL) 
Opposition 18 12 66.6 % 
Democratic Left  (DIMAR) Opposition 
(since June 
2013) 
14 11 78.6 % 
Communist Party of 
Greece (KKE) 
Opposition 12 0 0.0 % (refused) 
Independents Opposition 11 3 16.7 % 
    Opp. Parties 
(excl. KKE):  
39.8 % 
Unknown affiliation   5  
  300 77 Total (excl. 
KKE): 26.7% 
 
Source: Own data.  
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Table 2 Differences in the Positions of Voters and MPs (Difference of Means and Exact Logistic Regression Coefficients)* 
 
 ND SYRIZA PASOK ANEL XA DIMAR 
 
Difference 
of Mean 
(Voter-MP) 
 
(1) 
Exact 
Logistic 
Regression 
Co-efficient 
(2) 
Difference 
of Mean 
(Voter-MP) 
 
(3) 
Exact 
Logistic 
Regression 
Co-efficient 
(4) 
Difference 
of Mean 
(Voter-MP) 
 
(5) 
Exact 
Logistic 
Regression 
Co-efficient 
(6) 
Difference 
of Mean 
(Voter-MP) 
 
(7) 
Exact 
Logistic 
Regression 
Co-efficient 
(8) 
Difference 
of Mean 
(Voter-MP) 
 
(9) 
Exact 
Logistic 
Regression 
Co-efficient 
(10) 
Difference 
of Mean 
(Voter-MP) 
 
(11) 
Exact 
Logistic 
Regression 
Co-efficient 
(12) 
Left-Right -0.33 NA 2.88*** -.745** 0.27 NA -0.83 .207 0.75 NA 0.90 -.265 
Threat 0.30 NA -2.51** .358 -0.09 NA -2.44* .276 -2.39* NA 0.49 -.133 
Austerity -0.75 NA 1.64* .132 0.18 NA 1.64* -.891* 3.29** NA -0.77 .010 
EU -0.94 NA 0.21 -.008 -0.12 NA -0.36 .114 0.22 NA -3.79** .424** 
Immigration 0.78 NA 3.73*** -.436* 0.08 NA -1.49 .069 -2.19** NA 1.54* -.360 
             
Average 
difference 
(means) 
0.62 - 2.19 - 0.15 - 1.35 - 1.77 - 1.50 - 
N 
(Average) 114 - 98 70 51 - 41 32 24 - 50 43 
 
³Cell entries in columns 1,3,5,7, 9 and 11 display differences in means between voters and MPs, and the results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, * 
p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; cell entries in columns 4, 8 and 12 display exact logistic regression co-efficients, dependent variable: voters 0, MPs 1; 
statistically significant results are in bold, * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.   
 
Source: Own data.  
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1
 The use of tests of statistical significance in comparing our data on voters and MPs raises 
VRPHLPSRUWDQWPHWKRGRORJLFDOTXHVWLRQV)LUVWWKHVXUYH\RI03VZDVDµIXOOVXUYH\¶RIWKH
HQWLUHµSRSXODWLRQ¶RI03VDQGDVVXPLQJWKHUHLVQRVLJQLILFDQWQRQ-response bias, the results 
should thus be fully representative of the population of MPs. In this context, it could be 
argued that the use of tests of statistical significance is inappropriate (cf. Berk, Western & 
Weiss 1995). In our case, we are comparing the results from one source not involving a 
sampling process (MPs) with another source with data derived from a random population 
sample (voters). Therefore, the use of tests of significance may be justified. However, given 
the continued debate about the value of significance tests in general and their application to 
µIXOOVXUYH\V¶QRWLQYROYLQJDVDPSOLQJSURFHVVLQSDUWLFXODUFI%HKQNH%URVFKHLGDQG
Gschwend 2005), care should be taken not too rely too strongly on the results of statistical 
significance tests for any substantive conclusions. 
Second, there is the question which statistic test is appropriate for comparing the distribution 
from two independent surveys. We calculated both the two independent samples t-test of the 
difference of means and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of the differences in the 
underlying distribution. Both produce virtually identical results but as the latter is far more 
conservative in its assumptions, we rely on the results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test as 
an indication of the presence of a statistically significant difference in the underlying 
distributions in the positioning of voters and MPs on our five attitudinal dimensions. 
2
 This also shows the limitation of conceiving Left-Right as a super issue, when it may 
include both an economic and a libertarian/authoritarian dimension, among others. Golden 
Dawn is on the extreme right on the latter but they have unclear positions on the former.  
3
 This comparison between voters and all MPs only includes voters of the parties for which 
we have data on MPs (i.e. excluding KKE and minor parties), with the data on MPs weighted 
according to their representation in parliament. 
4
 Both items have been used in several surveys to measure attitudes to immigration as part of 
D IRXU LWHPVFDOH&URQEDFK¶VDOSKD IRU WKHVH WZR LWHPV LV $Gding the scores of both 
questions (recoded for direction) produced a scale from 2-10 which was transformed into 0-
10 scale with the formula y=(x-2)(8/10) to facilitate comparison with the other variables. 
5
 For ND and PASOK, the complete absence of any statistically significant differences 
between the positioning of voters and MPs for all dimensions makes a multi-variate analysis 
in any case redundant. For Golden Dawn, a regression analysis would have been of interest 
but the regression model does not compute, presumably because of a combination of a very 
low number of cases and highly unbalanced data. For example, all Golden Dawn MPs 
selected the most extreme option for immigration. 
6
 The models were fitted with STATA 13 using the exlogistic command; binary logistic 
regressions were also conducted and produced very similar results. The only difference was 
that one variable, the threat of austerity, was a statistically significant predictor for SYRIZA 
in the binary model but not in the exact logistic regression model.  
